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Summary
Introduction ,
The central theme of this dissertation is the content and operation of the
Dutch concept of reasonableness and fairness (r«te///JfcAe/V/ e/i fc/7///M«rf)
related to companies limited by shares, in particular with regard to the
relationships between majority and minority shareholders, between the
general shareholders' meeting and the board of directors, and between the
directors themselves. Its operation and content are examined on the basis
of reflections on the acts and decisions influencing these relationships.
In the Netherlands, no clear picture exists as yet of the operation of
'reasonableness and fairness' with regard to the relationships within
companies. This study intends to contribute towards the development of
clearer rules of reasonableness and fairness in these relationships within
companies limited by shares. Dutch law and legal literature leave many
questions unanswered on the operation and content of reasonableness and
fairness in company law. In consequence, the author has paid much
attention to comparative law. In her analysis of possible conflicts which
may arise in companies limited by shares, she has included the laws of
two other continental countries, Germany and France, as well as the law
of England and Wales as an exponent of the Common Law tradition.
'Reasonableness and Fairness' from-a Comparative Perspective
The author examines how and to what extent the principle of 'good faith'
is applied in connection with companies limited by shares under Dutch
and foreign law. For this purpose, a conscious choice has been made for
a functional approach, in which problem analysis prevails. It may be
concluded that in the foreign systems under study corresponding norms
exist for assessing the acts of the parties involved, although their ter-
minology, content and scope differ. English company law offers com-
parative material in the form of 'fiduciary duties'. Under English law, the
'fiduciary relationship' is essential. Furthermore, case law relating to s.
459 Companies Act 1985, governing the acts of (majority) shareholders,
has further defined the concept of 'good faith'. Under German law, the
'7rewp_/7/cÄ/' regulates the acts of shareholders and directors. Where under
Dutch law the notion of abuse of law and abuse of (majority) power is
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absorbed by reasonableness and fairness (see Chapter 1), in Germany,
similarly, the doctrine of abuse of law is for the most part absorbed by
the 7re«/j/7/cA/. In France, on the other hand, 'good faith' in company
law is placed within the context of abuse of law, abuse of majority or
minority power ('OÖMJ <fe ma/ome/'aÖMJ <fe /m'/iome) and abuse of powers
rfe powvoiry'). Furthermore, in recent case law the Co«r de Cay-
has held the duty of loyalty to be a separate and independent
ground for testing the acts of directors.
The Relationship between Majority and Minority Shareholders
In Part I of the study, the author has attempted to make an inventory of
the types of conflict which may arise in the relationship majority/minority
shareholders. A distinction was made for this purpose between conflicts
relating to the decision-making process at and around shareholders'
meetings and conflicts in relation to the content of resolutions to be
passed. In Chapter 2 it is made clear that in all legal systems under study
the powers of majority shareholders are not limitless. The way in which
this idea has been given shape differs from system to system. In order to
make a meaningful analysis, the author distinguishes between testing the
decision-making process and testing the content of decisions.
In CTia/jrer 3 the role of 'reasonableness and fairness' -and of com-
parable principles abroad- is examined in the various stages of the deci-
sion-making process. Notification, agenda setting and the course of affairs
during the general shareholders' meeting are studied. The core notion is
"proper" decision making, especially from the perspective of the minority
shareholder.
This theme is continued in C/ja/j^r 4, where attention is paid to the
possible extent of leaving the decision making to others. In the author's
view, the requirement of 'reasonableness and fairness' does not only
apply to the exercise of the rights to attend meetings and to vote at
meetings, but also to the transfer of these rights through voting agree-
ments or proxies (Chapter 4 at 1.1 and 2.3).
It is furthermore argued that the requirement of reasonableness and
fairness gives direction to regulating the acts of those shareholders who
through "vote clustering" can exercise more influence than warranted by
the size of their participation. The importance of this issue is underscored




It is contended that the extent of obligations imposed on shareholders and
their proxies by the requirement of reasonableness and fairness varies.
The principal assumption is that the degree of influence a shareholder
exercises should be commensurate with the degree of responsibility
carried (cf Chapter 4 at 1.2 and Chapter 12 at 6.2). <
Trie relationship between shareholders and the difference in control
between majority and minority shareholders are not only felt during the
decision-making process, but in particular when a final decision is made
as to the content of a resolution. Even where the procedure by which the
resolution was taken was flawless, the resolution may still turn out to be
contrary to the interests of the minority shareholders to the degree that
interference is justified.
'Reasonableness and fairness', and similar concepts abroad, must
therefore also have a control function with regard to the content of
resolutions in order to protect the company and the (minority) sharehol-
ders. This, however, raises the question of the extent of such control. It
should be particularly borne in mind that it is a major premise of decision
making in a company limited by shares that resolutions are passed by
majority vote. On the other hand, this is not a license for passing un-
reasonable and unfair resolutions (see before Chapter 1 at 9.2).
In C/topterj 5 a/u/ 6 an attempt is made to specify and examine more
thoroughly from the perspective of reasonableness and fairness conflicts
which may arise as a result of types of resolutions, whose content may in
particular affect minority shareholders. Examples of such resolutions are
those to change the organisation of the company -and consequently to
amend the articles of association- and resolutions directly involving the
position of the shareholders, since they relate to (the reservation or
distribution of) dividends.
With regard to changes to the organisation of the company and the
articles of association, the study in C/ia/tfer 5 shows that the courts
employ the criterion of whether and, if so, to what extent the company's
interest has been prejudiced, rather than whether minority shareholders
have been negatively affected.
In connection with dividend resolutions, C/za/?/er 6 reveals that in all
systems under investigation so-called "starving" of minority shareholders
is pre-empted, but the way in which this is done and the result which may
be achieved vary from country to country.
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The Relationship between the General Shareholders' Meeting and the
Board of Directors
In Part II of the study attention is paid to the power and the legal relation-
ships between the general shareholders' meeting and the board of direc-
tors. Those relations are also coloured by the rule of reasonableness and
fairness. By discussing such subjects as the right to give instructions, the
appointment and removal of directors, as well as the problem of corporate
opportunities, the author has made an attempt to show the power relation-
ship and the power struggle between the general shareholders' meeting
and the directors. When assessing conflicts of interest, it should be borne
in mind that directors must act in the interest of the company and its
business when exercising their duties.
C/ia/>rer 7 deals with the distribution of powers between the general
shareholders' meeting and the directors. Worth noticing is that in German
law, unlike English and French law, the 7r«(p./7/c/zr may play a role in
issues of distribution of powers between the general shareholders' meeting
and the directors. German case law shows that by virtue of unwritten law
the shareholders meeting may possess powers other than statutory ones. In
case law relating to the German Civil Code (see Chapter 7 at 2.1) there is
an express assumption that if directors take decisions by which the rights
of shareholders are seriously jeopardised, 'reasonableness and fairness'
requires that the general shareholders' meeting be consulted. The author
contends that in the Netherlands 'reasonableness and fairness' also plays a
role in the distribution of powers between the general shareholders'
meeting and the directors. This may result in the mandatory co-operation
of the general shareholders' meeting in decisions likely to seriously affect
the shareholders (see Chapter 7 at 2.3).
In C/ia/?/er S the proposition is defended that, in spite of the fact that
under Dutch law there are no rules governing directorship, the require-
ment of reasonableness and fairness entails that directors must be fit and
capable to fulfil their duties. The continuity of the company and/or the
company's business is at stake here.
The power struggle between the general shareholders' meeting and the
directors manifests itself most clearly in procedures by which the general
shareholders' meeting removes or suspends directors. In O iapw 9 it is
argued that the requirement of reasonableness and fairness also plays a
role in decisions regarding suspension or removal. The author contends
that there is not only room to test such decisions against procedural
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grounds, but also against substantive grounds. This represents a departure
from the prevailing theory by which it is assumed, on the basis of Articles
134 and 244 Book 2 Dutch Civil Code that directors may be suspended or
removed at all times.
A second issue, in which the conflict of interest between the general
shareholders' meeting and the directors arises, is the problem of corporate
opportunities. In Oia/tfer 70 the author submits that the requirement of
reasonableness and fairness regulates the acts of those directors who use
corporate opportunities to their personal advantage. The duty of loyalty,
which in each of the systems under study is expected of directors, is not
only owed, she argues, to the company, but also to the shareholders. In
consequence, she considers the norm of Article 9 Book 2 Dutch Civil
Code, deemed appropriate by most scholarly writers, as too limited a
ground for testing issues of corporate opportunities.
The Relationship between Directors
In the Part III, the final part of the study, the relationship between
directors is examined. This relationship is also governed in part by the
requirement of reasonableness and fairness as specified in Article 8 Book
2 Dutch Civil Code.
The organisation and the decision making of company directors are the
subject of C7wp/er 77. As regards the organisation of the board of
directors, the author investigates whether and, if so, to what extent,
delegation, mandate and instruction are allowed within the board of a
company limited by shares. Where decision-making is concerned, she
pays attention to the question of the extent to which there is a duty to
consult and a duty to inform, or conversely, a right to be consulted and a
right to be informed. Two instruments are discussed which could enhance
the decision-making process and the functioning of the board of directors
in the event of absenteeism of one or more directors, namely the pos-
sibility to confer a power of attorney and decision-making in writing.
The Reasonableness and Fairness-Test; Relevant Factors
An attempt has been made to analyze (potential) conflicts of interest from
the perspective of reasonableness and fairness. The question of what
determines the outcome of the analysis is dealt with in C/wpter 72.
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Reviewing the preceding chapters, the author distinguishes at least eight
factors which play a role of sorts in determining 'reasonableness and
fairness' in concrete cases:
1. the capacity of the person(s) involved in the conflict;
2. the influence the person(s) involved is/are capable of exercising;
3. the dual role/conflicting interests of the person(s) involved;
4. the nature and content of the decision;
5. the consequence of the decision or act for the person(s) involved;
6. the compensation for the person(s) involved as a result of the decision;
7. the character of the company;
8. the agreements between the parties involved.
The degree of importance of these factors and the ultimate resolution
of a conflict depend on the court's assessment of all relevant circumstan-
ces. The assessment is also determined in part by the legal system which
the court is bound to apply. For example, compared to their Dutch,
German and English counterparts, French judges exercise more restraint
with regard to substantive testing of decisions. Only in clear cases of
abuse of law, abuse of (majority or minority) power, or abuse of powers
will the judge impose such sanctions as annulment of the decision. This is
somewhat compensated, however, by the range of preventative measures
offered in French law to minority shareholders in particular, such as the
possibility to request the court to appoint a '/na/uftzftun de y'wsftce' (</
Chapter 2 at 5.2).
In Conclusion
Traditionally, 'reasonableness and fairness' has been a fascinating concept
of Dutch contract law. With this book the author hopes to have demon-
strated that this also holds true for company law. Furthermore, it is hoped
that her observations have broadened the outlook on the meaning and
operation of 'reasonableness and fairness' in company law. May they
have contributed to a further analysis and development of legal views on
this subject.
Translated by Louise Rayar
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